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Entanglement, the essential resource in quantum information processing, should be witnessed in
many tasks such as quantum computing and quantum communication. The conventional entan-
glement witness method, relying on an idealized implementation of measurements, could wrongly
conclude a separable state to be entangled due to imperfect detections. Inspired by the idea of
a time-shift attack, we construct an attack on the conventional entanglement witness process and
demonstrate that a separable state can be falsely identified to be entangled. To close such detec-
tion loopholes, based on a recently proposed measurement-device-independent entanglement witness
method, we design and experimentally demonstrate a measurement-device-independent entangle-
ment witness for a variety of two-qubit states. By the new scheme, we show that an entanglement
witness can be realized without detection loopholes.
2Quantum entanglement plays an important role in the nonclassical phenomenons of quantum mechanics. Being
the key resource for many tasks in quantum information processing, such as quantum computation [1], quantum
teleportation [2], and quantum cryptography [3, 4], entanglement needs to be verified in many scenarios. There are
several proposals to witness entanglement and we refer to Ref. [5] for a detailed review. A conventional way to
detect entanglement, the entanglement witness (EW), gives one of two outcomes: “Yes” or “No”, corresponding to
the conclusive result that the state is entangled or to failure to draw a conclusion, respectively. Mathematically, for
a given entangled quantum state ρ, a Hermitian operator W is called a witness, if tr[Wρ] < 0 (output of ‘Yes’) and
tr[Wσ] ≥ 0 (output of ‘No’) for any separable state σ. Note that there could also exist an entangled state ρ′ such
that tr[Wρ′] ≥ 0 (output of ‘No’). In the experimental verification, one can realize the conventional EW with only
local measurements by decomposing W into a linear combination of product Hermitian observables [5].
Focusing on the bipartite scenario, a general illustration of the conventional EW is shown in Fig. 1(a), where
two parties, Alice and Bob, each receive one component of a bipartite state ρAB from an untrusted third party
Eve. They want to verify whether ρAB is entangled or not, by performing local operations and measurements on
ρA = TrB[ρAB] and ρB = TrA[ρAB]. The correctness of such witness relies on implementation details of W . An
unfaithful implementation of W , say, due to device imperfections, would render the witness results unreliable. For
example, the measurement devices used by Alice and Bob might possibly be manufactured by another untrusted party,
who could collaborate with Eve and deliberately fabricate devices to make the real implementation W ′ = W + δW
deviate from W , such that W ′ is not a witness any more,
tr[W ′σ] < 0 < tr[Wσ]. (1)
That is, with the deviated witness W ′, a separable state σ could be identified as an entangled one, which is more
likely to happen when tr[Wσ] is near zero.
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FIG. 1. (a) Conventional EW setup, where Alice and Bob perform local measurements separately and collect information to
decide whether the input state is entangled or not. (b) Measurement-device-independent (MDI) EW setup, where Alice and
Bob each prepare an ancillary state and a third party Eve performs Bell state measurements (BSMs) on the ancillary states
and the to-be-witnessed bipartite state. Based on the choices of Alice and Bob’s ancillary states and the BSM results, they can
judge whether the input state is entangled or not.
There is a strong similarity between the EW and the quantum key distribution (QKD) where an entanglement-
breaking channel would cause insecurity [6]. Roughly speaking, it is crucial for Alice and Bob to prove that entan-
glement can be preserved in a secure QKD channel. From this point of view, there exists a correlation between the
security of the QKD and the success of the EW. For the varieties of attacks in the QKD, such as time-shift attacks [7]
and fake-state attacks [8], one may also find similar detection loopholes in the conventional EW process. Originating
from this analogy, we construct a time-shift attack that manipulates the efficiency mismatch between detectors used in
an EW process. Under this attack, any state could be witnessed to be entangled, even if the input state is separable.
By this example, we demonstrate that there do exist loopholes in the conventional EW procedure.
Recently, Lo et al. [9] proposed a measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD method, which is immune to all
hacking strategies on detection. Due to the similarity between the QKD and the EW, one would also expect that there
exist EW schemes without detection loopholes. Meanwhile, a nonlocal game is proposed to distinguish any entangled
state from all separable states [10]. Inspired by this game, Branciard et al. [11] proposed an MDIEW method, where
they proved that there always exists an MDIEW for any entangled state with untrusted measurement apparatuses.
As shown in Fig. 1(b), Alice and Bob want to identify whether a given bipartite state, prepared by an untrusted
party Eve, is entangled or not without trusting measurement devices. To do so, Alice (Bob) prepares an ancillary
state τs (ωt) and sends it along with the to-be-witnessed bipartite state to a willing participant, who can be assumed
to be Eve again in the worst case scenario. Eve performs two Bell-state measurements (BSMs) on the two ancillary
states and the bipartite state. Then, she announces to Alice and Bob the results of BSMs, based on which they will
witness the entanglement of the bipartite state. In the MDIEW, it is guaranteed that a separable state will never
3be wrongly identified as an entangled one, even if Eve maliciously makes wrong measurements and/or announces
unfaithful information [11].
In the experiment, we first show an example of the time-shift attack on the conventional EW process and demonstrate
how a separable state can be falsely identified to be entangled when a large efficiency mismatch happens. Then we
design and experimentally realize an MDIEW scheme to close such detection loopholes. The MDIEW is used to testify
the entanglement of various bipartite states starting from maximally entangled to separable ones. Note that we use
heralded single-photon sources to prepare the two ancillary states; thus, our demonstration is realized by a six-photon
interferometry.
Time-shift attack, originated from quantum cryptography [7], takes advantage of the efficiency mismatch of the
measurement devices. As shown in Fig. 2(a), typically two detectors are used on each side of Alice and Bob. By
controlling the single-photon-counting modules (SPCMs) and coincidence gate, Eve is able to enlarge the efficiency
mismatch and hence manipulate the EW result.
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FIG. 2. Time shift attack on the conventional EW. (a) Experimental setup of the time-shift attack. Photon pairs are generated
by SPDC using a femtosecond pump laser with a central wavelength of 390 nm and a repetition frequency of 80 MHz. POL:
polarizer, HWP: half-wave plate, QWP: quarter-wave plate, IF: interference filter with 780 nm central wavelength, PBS:
polarizing beam splitter, SFC: single-mode fiber coupler, SMF: single-mode fiber, SPCM: single-photon-counting module, some
with extra internal delay lines. (b) Synchronization between SPCMs. Build-in delay lines enable Eve to shift the output signals
da1 and db0 by ∆t. (c) Coincidence count versus time delay, where the time window is set to 4 ns. All data points are measured
for 2 seconds, and the time-shift attack is implemented with ∆t = 5.50 ± 0.24 ns, which corresponds to the grey area.
To implement this attack, we choose a conventional witness
W =
1
2
I − |Ψ−〉〈Ψ−|,
for bipartite states in the form of
ρvAB = (1− v)|Ψ−〉〈Ψ−|+
v
2
(|HH〉〈HH |+ |V V 〉〈V V |), (2)
where H (V ) denotes the horizontal (vertical) polarization of the single photons and |Ψ−〉 = (|HV 〉 − |V H〉)/√2 is a
Bell state. By decomposing W into a linear combination of product Pauli matrices, the EW can be realized by local
measurements,
Tr[WρAB] =
1
4
(1 + 〈σxσx〉+ 〈σyσy〉+ 〈σzσz〉) .
That is, to identify the entanglement, Alice and Bob just have to each analyze the qubit state in three bases separately.
When the bipartite state is projected to the positive (negative) eigenstates of σxσx, σyσy, and σzσz , it will contribute
positively (negatively) to the witness result Tr[WρAB]. For example, when measuring σxσx, Alice and Bob will both
project the input state to the eigenstates of σx, σ
+
x or σ
−
x , with corresponding eigenvalues of +1 or −1, respectively,
and obtain probabilities 〈σ±x σ±x 〉. Then the value of 〈σxσx〉 is defined as 〈σ+x σ+x 〉+ 〈σ−x σ−x 〉− 〈σ+x σ−x 〉− 〈σ−x σ+x 〉. From
Eve’s point of view, she wants to convince Alice and Bob that the bipartite state is entangled, that is, Tr[WρAB] < 0.
4Thus, her objective is to suppress the positive contributions of Tr[WρAB], such as 〈σ+x σ+x 〉 and 〈σ−x σ−x 〉 for the σxσx
measurement, by manipulating the coincidence rate between SPCMs, equivalently enlarging the detector efficiency
mismatch. In this case, from Alice and Bob’s point of view, the real implemented witness W ′ is deviated from the
desired one W , and satisfies Eq. (1). More details of the time-shift attack can be found in Appendix.
In our experiment, as shown in Fig. 2(a), by encoding qubits in the polarization of photons, the bipartite state
(|HH〉ab+ |V V 〉ab)/
√
2 is generated via spontaneous parametric down conversion (SPDC). Two adjustable POLs are
used to disentangle the initial state and project it to |HH〉ab and |V V 〉ab with equal probabilities, corresponding to
the separable state with v = 1 in Eq. (2). After a 45◦ HWP, the to-be-witnessed two-qubit system is prepared in
the state of ρAB = (|HV 〉 〈HV |+ |V H〉 〈V H|) /2. Then Alice and Bob each perform polarization analysis on a qubit
from the bipartite state using waveplates, PBSs and SPCMs, and guide the electronic signals from the SPCMs into a
coincidence gate.
As shown in Fig. 2(b), in the time-shift attack, Eve controls the delay lines in the detection systems and the
time window of the coincidence gate, and hence, manipulates the time-dependent coincidence counting rates between
detectors da0 and db0, da1 and db1. Hence, she can suppress the positive contributions of measurements 〈σxσx〉 , 〈σyσy〉
and 〈σzσz〉. In our demonstration, by setting proper parameters, we let the positive contributions drop to 10.9(1) %
of their original values. Since this attack would not affect the negative contributions of Tr[WρAB], the experimental
outcomes for 〈σxσx〉 , 〈σyσy〉 and 〈σzσz〉 become negative as expected. Finally, Alice and Bob obtain a witness of ρAB
be tr [W ′ρAB] = −0.379 (4), although the input state ρAB is, in fact, separable. By changing ∆t to a larger value,
one can even obtain a fake result for that from a maximal entangled state. Thus, a separable bipartite state could be
wrongly witnessed to be entangled when Eve is able to manipulate the detection system. It is not hard to see that
for any state ρ, Eve can perform a similar attack and trick Alice and Bob into thinking that it is entangled.
Note that in the original time-shift attack in the QKD [7], Eve is only able to partially control the detection efficiency
by manipulating the timing of the quantum signals. In that case, Eve cannot arbitrarily enlarge the efficiency mismatch
between desired and undesired detection events. In the EW case, there are two quantum signals Eve can manipulate.
From our demonstration, we show that by controlling the coincident gates, Eve is able to arbitrarily decrease the
coincident detection efficiency (down to 0) for any type of detection events. Thus, Eve can make the EW device
output any of her desired results. From this point of view, the efficiency mismatch problem is more serious in the
EW.
MDIEW is able to close all loopholes introduced by imperfect measurement devices. In this scheme, to witness
entanglement existing in a bipartite state ρAB, Alice and Bob randomly choose and prepare ancillary states τs and
ωt from state sets {τs}, {ωt}, respectively. By performing two BSMs on the ancillary states and the bipartite state
ρAB as shown in Fig. 1(b), conditional probabilities p(a, b|τs, ωt) = Tr[(Ma ⊗ M b)(τs ⊗ ρAB ⊗ ωt)] are obtained,
whereMa(M b) denotes the positive operator-valued measure (POVM) element of Eve’s BSM with outcome a(b). The
convex combination of the probabilities p(a, b|τs, ωt)
J(ρAB) =
∑
a,b,s,t
βa,bs,t p(a, b|τs, ωt) (3)
define an MDIEW. That is, ρAB is entangled while J(ρAB) < 0 and for any separable state σAB, we have J(σAB) ≥ 0.
For any entangled state ρAB and its conventional witness W , one can construct a MDIEW in the form of Eq. (3)
by decomposing W as a linear combination of product Hermitian operators, {τs ⊗ ωt}, which are used as the density
matrices of the ancillary states [11]. The coefficients β depend on W , the outcomes of the BSMs, and ancillary states.
We leave the calculation of β to Appendix.
Our experimental setup for MDIEW is shown in Fig. 3, where a six-photon interferometry is utilized. The to-be-
witnessed bipartite state ρv34, defined in Eq. (2), is encoded in the photon pair 3 and 4. Photon pairs 1, 2 and 5,
6 are used to prepare the ancillary input states |τs〉2 and |ωt〉5, respectively. In our work, various bipartite states
{ρv34}, from maximally entangled to separable, are prepared and tested with the MDIEW. The bipartite state ρv34
is first prepared in the Bell state |Φ−〉34 = (|HH〉 − |V V 〉) /
√
2 via a Bell-state synthesizer [12]. As the coherence
length of photons is limited by the interference filtering, two 2-mm BBO crystals in each arm result in a relative phase
delay between horizontal and vertical polarization components and cause polarization decoherence. Different v can
be selected by the “state selector” [13]. They satisfy the relation
v = cos2 (2θ) , (4)
where θ is the angle of the fast axis of the selector HWP.
In the experiment, eight ancillary state pairs {τs, ωt} are prepared. The states are encoded by tunable waveplates
(one HWP sandwiched by two QWPs), which can realize arbitrary single-qubit unitary transformation. Different
from direct polarization measurement in the conventional EW, the analysis of MDIEW is completed by BSMs on
ρv3 ⊗ |τs〉〈τs|2 and ρv4 ⊗ |ωt〉〈ωt|5, with two, |Φ±〉 = (|HH〉 ± |V V 〉)/
√
2, out of four outcomes being collected.
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FIG. 3. Experimental setup for the MDIEW. The photon pairs are generated by type-II SPDC in 2-mm β-barium-borate
(BBO) crystals. The pulsed pump laser has a central wavelength of 390 nm and a repetition rate of 76 MHz. To prepare
the desired state (2), two 2-mm decoherer BBOs (D BBO) on each side with fast axis setting at 0◦ (up) and 180◦ (down) to
reduce the spatial walk-off effect. By changing the angle θ of the selector HWP (S HWP), the desired state (2) is prepared
with v = cos2(2θ). Heralded photons 2 and 5 are triggered by the detections of photon 1 and 6, respectively. Waveplates are
used to rotate the polarizations to encode photons 2 and 5 to the desired states, |τs〉2 and |ωt〉5. The BSM module is composed
of three PBSs and two HWPs at 22.5◦. All photons are filtered by narrow-band filters (with λFWHM = 2.8 nm for BSM I and
λFWHM = 8.0 nm for BSM II) and then coupled into single-mode fibers which connect to SPCMs.
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FIG. 4. MDIEW values are compared for three cases. The theoretical results (Jth, solid line) are calculated for the states
ρvAB with different values of v in Eq. (2). The tomography results (Jtom, triangle points) are evaluated for the states ρ
v
34 after
performing tomography on the to-be-witnessed bipartite state. Each point of the experimental results (Jexp, circular points)
is measured from a 16-hour experiment. Vertical error bars indicate one standard deviation and horizontal error bars of the
fitting values v from state tomography are described in Appendix. The inset shows theoretical and experimental values of
tangle for input states ρv34.
As defined in Eq. (3), we obtain the experimental results Jvexp as shown in Fig. 4. In comparison, we also plot
Jth(ρ
v
AB) for all values of v. Recall that in the aforementioned time-shift attack demonstration, the conclusion from
the conventional witness is entangled for v = 1, whereas here we show that our MDIEW result is 0.107 ± 0.019 and
does not conclude an entangled state. One can see that our MDIEW is immune to this attack. The BSM results
only provide as information whether or not the entanglement is successfully swapped. It is the ancillary states that
determine whether the detection event contributes positively or negatively to the witness value defined in Eq. (3).
Thus, by knowing and/or manipulating the BSM results, Eve cannot suppress the positive components of the witness,
nor can she render the MDIEW to false conclusions.
Furthermore, we perform tomography on the to-be-witnessed bipartite states {ρv34}. The results of the density
matrices are shown in Appendix. The values of v are also fitted according to Eq. (4) in Appendix, which are consistent
with tomography results. We evaluate the MDIEW results, Eq. (3), from the results of the state tomography Jtom
as shown in Fig. 4. Meanwhile, to quantify the entanglement of the bipartite states {ρv34}, we adopt the measure of
tangle [14], which can be directly calculated from tomography results. When the tangle goes to zero, the bipartite
state becomes a separable state. As shown in the insert of Fig. 4, no entanglement exists when v grows beyond 1/2.
6Such a phenomenon is related to the “sudden death of entanglement” [15].
In summary, we show that the conventional EW is unconfident due to the loopholes on detections. Meanwhile, as
a countermeasure, we design and implement the MDIEW for the bipartite scenario, which is immune to all detection
loopholes. The experimental results show that the MDIEW is practical for real-life implementation. Our method can
be extended to other multipartite quantum tasks, such as quantum secret sharing.
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Appendix A: MDIEW
Measurement-device-independent entanglement witness (MDIEW) provides means to witness entanglement of a
quantum state without trusting measurement devices [11]. The idea of MDIEW is inspired from the MDI quantum
key distribution (MDIQKD) [9]. As proved in Ref. [11], there always exists an MDIEW for any quantum state ρ,
as one can always construct MDIEW based on the conventional witness W which exists for any quantum state (we
refer to [5] for details of conventional entanglement witness). In the following, we will design an MDIEW scheme and
apply it to a type of bipartite quantum states in the form of
ρvAB = (1 − v)|Ψ−〉〈Ψ−|+
v
2
(|00〉〈00|+ |11〉〈11|), (A1)
with v ∈ [0, 1] and |Ψ−〉 = (|01〉 − |10〉)/√2. The state is entangled if v < 1/2, which can be witnessed by a
conventional EW,
W =
1
2
I − |Ψ−〉〈Ψ−|, (A2)
and its result, tr[WρvAB] = (2v − 1)/2.
Practically, the conventional EW can be realized with only local measurements by decomposing W into a linear
combination of product Hermitian observables. In the bipartite scenario of Alice and Bob, they only need to perform
local measurements to decide the entanglement of quantum states. In contrast, MDIEW requires Alice (Bob) to
prepare another ancillary state τs (ωt) and perform Bell-state measurements (BSMs) on the to be witnessed state and
the ancillary state. Conditioned on the measurement outcomes, a and b, MDIEW is defined as
J(ρAB) =
∑
s,t
βa,bs,t p(a, b|τs, ωt), (A3)
where the choice of the ancillary states are labeled by s and t. That is, ρAB is entangled while J(ρAB) < 0 and for
any separable state σAB, we have J(σAB) ≥ 0. Here the probabilities p(a, b|τs, ωt) are obtained from performing two
BSMs on the to be witnessed state ρAB and the ancillary states τs and ωt. That is,
p(a, b|τs, ωt) = Tr[(Ma ⊗Mb)(τs ⊗ ρAB ⊗ ωs)], (A4)
where Ma and Mb represent BSMs performed by Alice and Bob with outcome a and b, respectively. In Eq. (A3), the
coefficient βa,bs,t is determined by the choice of ancillary states, measurement outcomes and the conventional witness
W . In the experiment, as only two |Φ+〉 = (|00〉+ |11〉)/√2 and |Φ−〉 = (|00〉 − |11〉)/√2 out of four BSM outcomes
are recorded, we consider the outcomes of a and b to be + and −, which refer to |Φ+〉 and |Φ−〉, respectively. There
are four kinds of βa,bs,t , depending on different values of a and b. In the following, we will design β
a,b
s,t for our MDIEW.
The case of a = + and b = + is considered in Ref. [11]. Decompose a conventional EW as a linear combination of
product Hermitian operators, {τs ⊗ ωt},
W =
∑
s,t
β++s,t τ
T
s ⊗ ωTt , (A5)
7where the superscript T means matrix transpose. In the corresponding MDIEW, Alice and Bob prepare their ancillary
states into {τs} and {ωt}, respectively. According to Eq. (A4), p(+,+|τs, ωt) is obtained by projecting the joint
states trB [ρAB] ⊗ τs and trA[ρAB] ⊗ ωt to the maximally entangled states |Φ+AA〉 = (|00〉 + |11〉)/
√
2 and |Φ+BB〉 =
(|00〉+ |11〉)/√2, respectively. Then it is easy to show that the relation between MDIEW and the conventional EW is
J(ρAB) = tr[WρAB]/4, (A6)
which equals (2v − 1)/8 using Eq. (A1) and (A2).
In our work, we also consider other BSM outcomes. For example, if Alice and Bob get outcomes a = − and b = −,
then β−−s,t is calculated similarly as Eq. (A5) by decomposing W ,
W =
∑
s,t
β−−s,t τ˜
T
s ⊗ ω˜Tt , (A7)
where 〈j|τ˜ |i〉 = (−)i+j〈j|τ |i〉 and 〈j|ω˜|i〉 = (−)i+j〈j|ω|i〉. By redefining the basis that W is decomposed, {τ˜ ⊗ ω˜}, the
ancillary states prepared by Alice and Bob are still {τs} and {ωt}. In this case, p(−,−|τs, ωt) is obtained by projecting
the joint states trB[ρAB] ⊗ τs and trA[ρAB] ⊗ ωt to the maximally entangled states |Φ−AA〉 = (|00〉 − |11〉)/
√
2 and
|Φ−BB〉 = (|00〉 − |11〉)/
√
2, respectively.
With a similar manner, one can also decompose W for the cases of a = + and b = −, a = − and b = +. All the
four cases of a and b are summarized in Table I.
TABLE I. Decomposition of W based on different measurement outcomes.
MAA MBB W
|Φ+AA〉 = |0〉⊗|0〉+|1〉⊗|1〉√2 |Φ
+
BB〉 = |0〉⊗|0〉+|1〉⊗|1〉√2 W =
∑
s,t β
++
s,t τ
T
s ⊗ ωTt
|Φ−AA〉 = |0〉⊗|0〉−|1〉⊗|1〉√2 |Φ
−
BB〉 = |0〉⊗|0〉−|1〉⊗|1〉√2 W =
∑
s,t β
−−
s,t τ˜
T
s ⊗ ω˜Tt
|Φ+AA〉 = |0〉⊗|0〉+|1〉⊗|1〉√2 |Φ
−
BB〉 = |0〉⊗|0〉−|1〉⊗|1〉√2 W =
∑
s,t β
+−
s,t τ
T
s ⊗ ω˜Tt
|Φ−AA〉 = |0〉⊗|0〉−|1〉⊗|1〉√2 |Φ
+
BB〉 = |0〉⊗|0〉+|1〉⊗|1〉√2 W =
∑
s,t β
−+
s,t τ˜
T
s ⊗ ωTt
Next, we need to calculate the coefficients β±±s,t and the corresponding probabilities p(±,±|τs, ωt) for given ancillary
quantum states {τs} and {ωt}. Define σ0 = I and σ1, σ2, σ3 to be the Pauli matrices. Then let τs and ωs both be the
eigenstates of σs with eigenvalues of 1. That is, τ0 = ω0 = I/2, τs = ωs = (I + σs)/2 for s = 1, 2, 3. By decomposing
W into {τTs ⊗ωTt } and {τ˜Ts ⊗ ω˜Tt }, we find that the coefficients βabst and the probabilities p(a, b|τs, ωt) of the two cases
++ and −− are the same, and those of +− and −+ are the same.
In the cases of ++ and −−, the coefficients are given by
[β++st ] = [β
−−
st ] =


4 −1 −1 −1
−1 1 0 0
−1 0 1 0
−1 0 0 1

 , (A8)
with corresponding probabilities of
p(+,+|τs, ωt) = p(−,−|τs, ωt) =


1/16 1/16 1/16 1/16
1/16 (1− v)/16 1/16 1/16
1/16 1/16 (1 − v)/16 1/16
1/16 1/16 1/16 (1 − v)/8

 . (A9)
There are ten nonzero terms in the coefficient matrix, so ten different ancillary inputs (τs, ωt) are required. In
practice, it is possible to reduce the number of inputs by introducing two other states τ4 =
I+(σx+σy+σz)/
√
3
2 and
ω4 =
I+(σx+σy+σz)/
√
3
2 . In this case, we have another decomposition of W with coefficients of
[β++st ] = [β
−−
st ] =


2
√
3− 2 0 0 0 −√3
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
−√3 0 0 0 0

 . (A10)
8TABLE II. Coefficients and probabilities for MDIEW with outcomes ++ and −−. Note that when β = 0, the corresponding
probability p is irrelevant.
τ0 = I/2 τ1 =
I+σx
2
τ2 =
I+σy
2
τ3 =
I+σz
2
τ4 =
I+(σx+σy+σz)/
√
3
2
ω0 = I/2 β = 2
√
3− 2, p = 1
16
β = 0 β = 0 β = 0 β = −√3, p = 1
16
ω1 =
I+σx
2
β = 0 β = 1, p = 1−v
16
β = 0 β = 0 β = 0
ω2 =
I+σy
2
β = 0 β = 0 β = 1, p = 1−v
16
β = 0 β = 0
ω3 =
I+σz
2
β = 0 β = 0 β = 0 β = 1, p = 1−v
8
β = 0
ω4 =
I+(σx+σy+σz)/
√
3
2
β = −√3, p = 1
16
β = 0 β = 0 β = 0 β = 0
In this setting, only six ancillary sets are required (comparing to ten in the original construction). As a result, we
derive the coefficients and probabilities in Eq. (A3) for outcomes ++ and −−, as shown in Table II.
Similarly, for the other two cases of outcomes +− and −+, the coefficients are
[β−+st ] = [β
+−
st ] =


0 1 1 −1
1 −1 0 0
1 0 −1 0
−1 0 0 1

 (A11)
with corresponding probabilities of
p(+,−|τs, ωt) = p(−,+|τs, ωt) =


1/16 1/16 1/16 1/16
1/16 (1 + v)/16 1/16 1/16
1/16 1/16 (1 + v)/16 1/16
1/16 1/16 1/16 (1 − v)/8

 . (A12)
when using the ancillary states τ0 = ω0 = I/2, τs = ωs = (I + σs)/2 for s = 1, 2, 3. Similarly, we can define
τ ′4 =
I+(−σx−σy+σz)/
√
3
2 , ω
′
4 =
I+(−σx−σy+σz)/
√
3
2 so that another decomposition of W is derived,
[β+−st ] = [β
−+
st ] =


2
√
3 + 2 0 0 0 −√3
0 −1 0 0 0
0 0 −1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
−√3 0 0 0 0

 (A13)
Again, in this setting, only six measurements are required. The coefficients and probabilities of outcomes +− and
−+ are shown in Table III.
TABLE III. Coefficients and probabilities for MDIEW with outcomes +− and −+. Note that when β = 0, the corresponding
probability p is irrelevant.
τ0 = I/2 τ1 =
I+σx
2
τ2 =
I+σy
2
τ3 =
I+σz
2
τ ′4 =
I+(−σx−σy+σz)/
√
3
2
ω0 = I/2 β = 2
√
3 + 2, p = 1
16
β = 0 β = 0 β = 0 β = −√3, p = 1
16
ω1 =
I+σx
2
β = 0 β = −1, p = 1+v
16
β = 0 β = 0 β = 0
ω2 =
I+σy
2
β = 0 β = 0 β = −1, p = 1+v
16
β = 0 β = 0
ω3 =
I+σz
2
β = 0 β = 0 β = 0 β = 1, p = 1−v
8
β = 0
ω′4 =
I+(−σx−σy+σz)/
√
3
2
β = −√3, p = 1
16
β = 0 β = 0 β = 0 β = 0
Although each of the four cases above defines an MDIEW, we can combine four of them as one to enhance the
successful probability of MDIEW,
J =
1
4
∑
a,b
∑
s,t
βa,bs,t p(a, b|τs, ωt)
=
1
4
∑
s,t
(β++s,t p(+,+|τs, ωt) + β+−s,t p(+,−|τs, ωt) + β−+s,t p(−,+|τs, ωt) + β−−s,t p(−,−|τs, ωt))
(A14)
By doing this, we improve the efficiency of experiments by four times comparing to the original proposal [11].
To witness entanglement for the bipartite states defined in Eq. (A1) with MDIEW defined in Eq. (A14), in total
eight different ancillary state pairs should be prepared, and the results are summarized in Table IV.
9TABLE IV. Our MDIEW in the form of Eq. (A14) for the bipartite states defined in Eq. (A1).
τs ωt β
++
st = β
−−
st p(+,+|τs, ωt) = p(−,−|τs, ωt) β+−st = β−+st p(+,−|τs, ωt) = p(−,+|τs, ωt)
I/2 I/2 2
√
3− 2 1/16 2√3 + 2 1/16
I+σx
2
I+σx
2
1 (1− v)/16 −1 (1 + v)/16
I+σy
2
I+σy
2
1 (1− v)/16 −1 (1 + v)/16
I+σz
2
I+σz
2
1 (1− v)/8 1 (1− v)/8
I/2
I+(σx+σy+σz)/
√
3
2
−√3 1/16 0 -
I+(σx+σy+σz)/
√
3
2
I/2 −√3 1/16 0 -
I/2
I+(−σx−σy+σz)/
√
3
2
0 - −√3 1/16
I+(−σx−σy+σz)/
√
3
2
I/2 0 - −√3 1/16
Appendix B: Time-shift attack
The idea of time-shift attack is originated from quantum cryptography [7] and takes advantage of efficiency mis-
matches existing in measurement devices. Inspired by this idea, we construct a time-shift attack for the conventional
witness defined in Eq. (A2). Define σ0 = I and σ1, σ2, σ3 be the Pauli matrices σx, σy , and σz, correspondingly. Then
we can decompose W to
W =
1
4
(
3∑
i=0
σi ⊗ σi), (B1)
and the EW can be realized by local measurements,
Tr[WρAB] =
1
4
(1 + 〈σxσx〉+ 〈σyσy〉+ 〈σzσz〉) . (B2)
To realize the attack, we exploit the time mismatch of the two single-photon-counting modules (SPCMs) such that
one detector is more efficient than the other. In this case, the real implementation (W ′) is deviated from the original
design witness W . In the attack Eve can suppress the positive contributes of the witness result Tr[WρAB] to let the
witness result Tr[W ′ρAB] be negative by adjusting the time mismatch. For example, when measuring σxσx, Alice and
Bob will project the input state to the eigenstates of σx, that is σ
+
x and σ
−
x , corresponding to positive and negative
eigenvalue respectively, and obtain probabilities 〈σ±x σ±x 〉. Then the value of 〈σxσx〉 is defined as
〈σxσx〉 =
〈
σ+x σ
+
x
〉
+
〈
σ−x σ
−
x
〉− 〈σ+x σ−x 〉− 〈σ−x σ+x 〉 . (B3)
The probabilities 〈σ±x σ±x 〉 is measured from coincidence counts N±AN±B of detectors, that is
〈
σ±x σ
±
x
〉
=
N±AN
±
B∑
N±AN
±
B
. (B4)
If the positive coincidence counts are all suppressed, that is N+AN
+
B = N
−
AN
−
B = 0, then the outcome of 〈σxσx〉 is
〈σxσx〉 = −
〈
σ+x σ
−
x
〉− 〈σ−x σ+x 〉 = − N+AN−B∑N±AN±B −
N−AN
+
B∑
N±AN
±
B
= −1. (B5)
Similarly, the all the other local measurements 〈σyσy〉 and 〈σzσz〉 become −1 by suppressing positive coincidence
counts, which gives a witness result of
Tr[W ′ρAB] = −1
2
(B6)
for any state ρAB.
In our experiment demonstration, we only suppress the positive coincidence counts to 10.9(1)% instead of neglecting
all of them to make a wrong witness result of a separable state to be entangled.
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Appendix C: Tomography
In the experiment, we prepare the to-be-witnessed bipartite states ρvAB in the form of Eq. (A1) with different values
v. To verify whether the prepared states ρv34 is close to the desired ones ρ
v
AB, their density matrices are reconstructed
via quantum tomography with v controlled by the angle θ of the selector HWP, as shown in Eq. (4) in Main Text.
The results of the density matrices are shown in Fig. 5. Then we fit the value v by the measured density matrixes ρv34
to the desired states ρvAB. As shown in Eq. (A1), ρ
v
AB contains only real numbers, we can infer v from the real part
of ρv34, and the imaginary parts are supposed to be near zero.
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FIG. 5. Tomography of the bipartite state ρv34. Density matrices are constructed through tomography and over 250,000
coincidence detection events are obtained for each plot. Depending on the angle θ of the state selector defined in Eq. (4) in
Main Text, various states ρv34 are prepared. (a) Real part of the density matrices ρ
v
34. (b) Imaginary part of the density matrices
ρv34.
The parameter v can be derived from the real-part of matrix ρv34. For each matrix elements of ρ
v
34, ρ11, ρ22, ρ33, ρ44,
and ρ23 (ρ32 is identical to ρ23), one can estimate v, as shown in Table V. Accordingly, the average value of v and its
error bar are evaluated. As one can see that the experimental results agree the theoretical results well.
TABLE V. Tomography results of the input bipartite state.
vexperiment
θ vtheory vρ11 vρ22 vρ33 vρ44 vρ23 v¯exp δv¯exp δvexp
45 0 0.0196 0.0228 0.0064 0.0258 0.0290 0.0207 0.0039 0.0087
30 0.25 0.2580 0.2538 0.2426 0.2686 0.2644 0.2575 0.0045 0.0101
22.5 0.5 0.4944 0.4820 0.4824 0.5230 0.5108 0.4985 0.0081 0.0180
15 0.75 0.7298 0.7198 0.7280 0.7718 0.7620 0.7423 0.0103 0.0231
0 1 0.9680 0.9818 0.9222 0.9684 0.9822 0.9645 0.0110 0.0246
Appendix D: Tangle
To quantify the entanglement of quantum states, we adopt the measure of tangle [14]. For a 2-qubit state, ρAB,
one can evaluate its tangle by the following steps.
1. Define a non-Hermitian matrix
R = ρABΣρ
T
ABΣ, (D1)
where ρTAB is the transpose of ρAB, and the “spin flip matrix Σ” is defined as
Σ =


0 0 0 −1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
−1 0 0 0

 ; (D2)
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2. Calculate the eigenvalues of R, and arrange them in decreasing order, λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ λ3 ≥ λ4;
3. The concurrence of ρAB is defined as
C = max{0,
√
λ1 −
√
λ2 −
√
λ3 −
√
λ4}; (D3)
4. The tangle is defined as
tangle = C2. (D4)
The tangle of a bipartite state is a measure of entanglement. If the tangle is zero, then the bipartite state ρAB
must be a separable state. For states defined in Eq. (A1), we can calculate the corresponding tangle. By following the
aforementioned steps, we first calculate the four eigenvalues, 0, (1−v)2, v2/4, v2/4. For v > 2/3, we have v2/4 > (1−v)2
and hence tangle = C2 = 0. For 2/3 ≥ v, we have v2/4 ≤ (1−v)2 and hence
√
(1− v)2−2
√
v2/4 = 1−2v. Therefore,
C = 0 for v ≥ 1/2 and C = 1− 2v for v < 1/2,
tangle(ρvAB) =
{
(1− 2v)2 v < 1/2
0 v ≥ 1/2. (D5)
The fitting value of v from state tomography and the tangles are shown in Table VI.
TABLE VI. The tangle values of the input states by tomography.
θexp vtheory vexp verror tangle(ρ
v
34(θ)) tangleerror
45◦ 0 0.021 0.009 0.840 0.001
30◦ 0.25 0.257 0.010 0.233 0.001
22.5◦ 0.5 0.499 0.018 0 0
15◦ 0.75 0.742 0.023 0 0
0◦ 1 0.965 0.025 0 0
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